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Philosophy, as we know, is an abstract expression of worries, sentiments and longings 
that move people and societies. Philosophical debates are often innovative, but sometimes we 
have reason to ask ourselves why theydevelop at all and what general social trends they 
follow. An example of such a philosophical discussion—one that seems bewildering to 
many—is the current dispute between egalitarians and anti-egalitarians which has also 
reached German-speaking countries and which divides philosophers into opposing camps.  
Given feminist arguments against egalitarianism that seem initially to have the 
potential to erode the social responsibilities of societies, the debatemust seem especially 
strange to those feminist philosophers who have considered the European welfare state as a 
reasonable normative standard. The political shifts of the last decade, especially the change in 
former communist countries and the globalization of markets, provide the general social 
background for these challenges to egalitarian thinking.  
Yet a look at these causal factors does not answer compelling questions such as, Are 
the normative demands of a strict egalitarianism really binding? Are these demands morally 
compelling? Are the arguments with which we justify people’s acess to certain social and 
economic goods in fact egalitarian? Do we have to base an acceptable conception of society 
and its fundamental institutions on the ideal of equality at all?   
In this talk I shall not address in detail the debate between egalitarians and anti-
egalitarians. Instead I shall argue for an autonomy-based political theory that defines a 
specific structure among basic political values like universal respect, freedom, and equality. 
My claim is that such a theory integrates the value of equality in a form that allows us to leave 
behind the dispute between egalitarianism and anti-egalitarianism. Finally I shall try to show 
that an autonomy-oriented political theory is attractive from a feminist point of view. 
   
Freedom and Equality: Two Weighty Concepts 
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It is not an easy task to define the concepts “freedom” and “equality,” since both ideas 
are ambiguous and complex. I want to start with a basic concept of freedom or autonomy that 
seems adequate to the private and to the public sphere. I therefore propose that “freedom” be 
understood as the ability to determine autonomously the form of life that one wants to lead as 
long as this is compatible with the equal freedom of others. Defined in this way, the concept 
of freedom includes aspects of negative and positive freedom: one is free from (unjustified) 
restrictions x to do y.1  
This definition articulates a basic conception of social freedom and autonomy. To be 
autonomous means to have an attitude of critical reflection toward one’s immediate desires 
and wishes. Social freedom and autonomy as just defined are the basis for other forms of 
autonomy or freedom. Social freedom is, for example, the basis for moral autonomy. For 
persons to think of themselves as moral subjects, to give themselves a moral identity, it is 
necessary that they be able to autonomously live their conception of the good. Social 
autonomy is also necessary for political freedom— the freedom to participate in processes of 
public deliberation and choice. The idea that individuals should be able to participate as 
political subjects in the processes of public political deliberation is only meaningful in a 
context where people are able to choose their personal projects, goals, and values. 
Recognition of the basic importance of social freedom and autonomy allows us, 
further, to justify freedom of religion and freedom of speech. To choose one’s conception of 
life freely entails the ability to choose individual conceptions of the good that deviate 
substantially from the prevailing conventional doctrines of a society. Freedom of conscience 
and freedom of speech are necessary for the protection of these  minority attitudes. Equally, a 
democratic society must leave to its members the choice of whether to adopt a religious or a 
nonreligious form of life. Freedom of religion is therefore just as necessary as are the 
freedoms of conscience and speech. 
 To sum up: social freedom in the sense defined above is the basis of freedom of 
conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of sexual orientation, freedom of religion, and 
freedom of public assembly. Some of these freedoms require for their protection the guarantee 
of rights, e.g., personal rights, political rights, and social rights. 
Aside from freedom, equality is the other basic value of democratic political theory. 
The idea that people are equal is normatively axiomatic in democracies; a principle of 
equality (*OHLFKKHLWVJUXQGVDW]) is found in most constitutions. But “equality” is a complex 
notion. Often the realization of the ideal of equality includes moral arguments that are not 
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specifically egalitarian. By egalitarian arguments I mean considerations that are relational: 
any judgment about what goods a person should get is dependent on weighing the claims of 
each person in relation to the entire amount of goods available for distribution. However, if 
there are vast differences in wealth that allow some people to live in luxury and condemn 
others to hunger, then our striving for equality means improving the living conditions of the 
poor— an activity that in itself is not dependent on specifically egalitarian considerations.    
In a first step, we could identify equality with a formal principle of equal treatment 
that reads: 
 
Persons should be treated equally in regard to a parameter x as long as there exist no 
reasons for unequal treatment so powerful that no reasonable person could reject them. 
 
To get from this principle to a substantive notion of equality we have to specify the 
parameters in regard to which equality is relevant. A first parameter is the common humanity 
of people. People have equal basic needs and as vulnerable beings they equally need 
protection. This fact of shared humanity is a starting point for postulating a principle of 
universal respect (3ULQ]LSXQLYHUVHOOHU$FKWXQJ). Very often this principle of universal respect 
is understood as a basic principle of equality, and the frequent claim that equality is an 
intrinsic value refers to the notion of equality as universal respect. 
It seems to me misleading to interpret the principle of universal respect as a principle 
of equality. The decisive element in this principle is not the idea of equality but the idea of 
recognition. The principle of universal respect expresses the demand that all persons be 
recognized as persons, but it does not refer to any specifically egalitarian considerations. In 
the context of  emancipatory social movements the claim of equality can be easily translated 
into a claim of recognition. When members of ethnic minorities or other socially 
disadvantaged people appeal to the idea of equality, their appeal is motivated by a  longing for 
recognition, for respect. This includes the right to be treated not merely as a means, but as an 
end, not to be instrumentalized but to be treated as persons who are valuable as such. 
It is possible to read the principle of equal respect as a principle of equality. But then 
one has to consider that this principle does not without further argument support an egalitarian 
liberalism where equality is the paramount value. That the principle does not suffice to justify 
a strong egalitarian position in regard to social and economic goods can be seen by reflecting 
on libertarian conceptions, which also embrace the principle but are not sympathetic to the 
idea of egalitarian distributions. In libertarian political theories, the principle of equal respect  
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corresponds to the idea that all people equally have a strong right to their own person and the 
results of their labor and achievements.2      
I regard the principle of universal respect as an overriding value but I do not 
understand it as a genuine principle of equality. Genuine egalitarian principles involve 
relational considerations. That is to say, what one person gets depends on what goods are 
given to others in relation to the amount of goods available. Then we see that the normative 
ideal that we owe all people respect qua their humanity does not rest on relational 
consderations. Humanity is an absolute standard, not open to gradation. With regard to 
absolute standards of this kind, the principle of equal respect is simply a condition of 
impartiality, in the sense that one person cannot have a moral status which is refused to other 
beings who are equally human persons.  
The overriding principle of equal respect and equal recognition does not, then, amount 
to a genuine principle of equality. “ Equality”  in this context only means “ universality,”  that 
people equally deserve respect means simply that all people deserve respect. All people 
deserve recognition qua being human. Each person has a right to be respected in her dignity. 
But in justifying why persons deserve equal respect only the single fact of their being human 
is decisive. Relational considerations do not play a role. 
 Yet there exists another concept of equality, namely, the idea of distributive equality, 
where the parameters of equality refer to social or economic goods. This principle reads: 
 
 Social and economic goods should be distributed equally, as long as there do not exist 
good reasons, i.e., reasons that no one can reasonably reject, that justify an unequal 
distribution. 
 
 Distributive equality is a genuine principle of equality, as the distribution of goods 
involves considering how the claims of some people should be weighed in relation to the 
claims of others. Genuinely egalitarian principles are relational in that what one person gets 
depends on the legitimacy of the claims of others and the amount of goods available. 
Answering the question how we should distribute goods in accordance with criteria like need, 
desert, and merit involves relational considerations. 
The principle of distributive equality can be interpreted as a principle of strict equality 
or as a principle of equal chances. It seems more congruent with our notions of justice to read 
the distributive equality principle as a principle of equal chances to get social or economic 
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goods. Here the principle is decisive in directing us to ensure that individuals have an equal 
amount of goods, as long as there are no weighty reasons that justify an unequal distribution. 
Such reasons could be different amounts of time worked, different amounts of effort, or 
different talents indispensable to certain careers. 
 The reason why distributive equality should not be associated with strict equality is 
that people should be held responsible for those inequalities that are the direct result of their 
free decisions for a certain way of life. While all people have a right to basic help and support 
in emergency situations, individuals should not be compensated for those inequalities for 
which they are responsible.3 Considerations of efficiency that are indispensable in market-
oriented societies make it impossible to read the principle of distributive equality as requiring 
a strictly egalitarian distribution of goods.  
 So it seems more plausible to connect the idea of distributive equality to a principle of 
equal chances. The members of society should have at least an equal chance to enjoy the 
goods available. In relation to one set of social goods, namely, that of human rights and basic 
political rights, the idea of distributive equality amounts to strict equality. All people do have 
a claim to basic rights like the freedom of religion, of conscience, and of free speech. But the 
standard of strict equality does not hold for rights that people have acquired in connection 
with specific positions and specific contracts with others.   
The principle of equal respect states that all human beings deserve respect and 
recognition, and that we should consider equally the basic moral claims that human beings are 
entitled to make just in virtue of their being human. What exactly does it mean to respect 
human beings qua being human? The meaning of this abstract form of respect and recognition 
can be determined negatively. Then it means that instrumentalization and humiliation are 
forbidden on the level of personal interactions but also on the level of  the institutional design 
of societies.  
Yet respect and recognition also include a positive dimension which is somehow 
harder to define. In Kant’ s practical philosophy “ respect”  means treating persons as ends. This 
may be cast positively as a duty to help others to realize their ends. Here we must carefully 
distinguish between individual ethics and political morality, as only political morality can 
serve as the basis for an acceptable political theory. In the domain of individual ethics, the 
principle of equal respect directs us positively to share the ends of others; we see this 
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explicitly in Kant’ s Humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which demands that 
we act according to maxims whose ends others can share.4  
But in the context of political morality we have to search for another positive 
interpretation of “ respect.”  In this context, I believe, “ respect”  means guaranteeing people the 
freedom to pursue their conception of a good life, but it is also a positive demand for the 
means to realize their basic projects. The ideal of universal respect finds expression in the 
guarantee of people’ s basic social autonomy to pursue their conception of a good life. 
“ Respect”  here presupposes that people have basic personal and political rights, and it 
implies, moreover, that people have social rights that guarantee them at least a minimum of 
social and economic goods. Without these positive rights, our appeals to freedom would 
remain an empty way of talking.  
  
The Relationship between Freedom and Equality 
 
How should we conceive the relationship between freedom and equality?  I want to 
put forward the following thesis: Freedom in the form of basic social autonomy to pursue 
one's conception of a life is a value in itself. Distributive equality, which I regard as the only 
genuine principle of equality, is an instrumental value, necessary to the attainment of freedom 
and autonomy. The justification for regarding freedom and equality as values follows from 
the overriding status of the principle of universal respect.  
That all people deserve respect simply because they are human beings implies that 
they are entitled to freedom and autonomy, as well as to the social and economic means that 
permit them to realize these values. But the principle of universal respect, which I regard as 
an intrinsic value, is not a principle of equality. 
So here we have three important values: universal respect as an intrinsic value of 
overriding status, freedom as a value in itself, and equality as an instrumental value. This 
needs explanation. It seems reasonable to consider values under two aspects: their modality 
and their source.  
Seen from the aspect of  modality, an intrinsic value is a value in itself that also has its 
source in itself. The justification for regarding a value x as an intrinsic value cannot be found 
in another value; the justification has in a way come to an end. Both that a certain value is an 
intrinsic value and why it has this status can be shown by a regressive argument that reveals 
the normative idea expressed in the construction of a value as simply the end point in our 
                                                
4
 Kant, Immanuel, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1974, p. 58 (= Suhrkamp-
Werkausgabe Band VII). 
  
7 
 
analysis of the normative presuppositions underlying a moral or political theory. And I think 
that our reflections about what basic values we assume in an acceptable political conception 
show us that the idea that people are important as people and do have dignity is the motivating 
inspiration for all other normative constructions. 
An extrinsic value has its source in something else. An instrumental value is a value 
that has value only as a means to some end. Most instrumental values are extrinsic values, but 
there are some extrinsic values that are values in themselves, as when a person cherishes a 
present and the value of the present derives from the relationship of respect and friendship one 
entertains for the person who gave one the present.5 
Universal respect counts as an intrinsic political value; freedom is a value in itself, but 
not an intrinsic value; and distributive equality is an instrumental value, necessary to preserve 
freedom for all. The value inhering in freedom and distributive equality is derived from the 
principle of universal respect, hence freedom and equality are extrinsic values. 
Egalitarianism is often associated with the thesis that equality is an intrinsic value. But 
usually when philosophers regard equality as an intrinsic value they are thinking of equality 
as universal respect. Equality in the form of an equal distribution of goods is not an intrinsic 
value— it is not even a value in itself, mainly for two reasons. First, we can hardly justify a 
strict egalitarianism regarding goods as a plausible social ideal, as it conflicts with our 
intuition that not all forms of inequality are morally problematic. Second, even a moderate 
egalitarianism in the form of equal chances for certain goods does not declare equality to be 
an intrinsic value, as in this case the axiological status of equality depends on other values, 
e.g., its contribution to autonomy. And this functional role in regard to autonomy renders 
equality, understood as a differentiated form of egalitarianism, an instrumental value. 
If one conceives of distributive equality as an instrumental value, as I do, then one 
does not necessarily marginalize the idea of equality and one is not an anti-egalitarian. The 
instrumental role of distributive equality does not undermine the importance of such 
regulations as affirmative action rules, such as quotas for women that seem to be a direct 
result of a constitutional principle of equality. One can understand these regulations as a 
means of securing the basic freedom and autonomy of women to pursue a conception of life 
that might include a specific way to make a living.   
The position I defend does not exclude egalitarian considerations altogether, but it is 
far from defending egalitarianism as an intrinsic value. An autonomy-based political theory 
involves a principle of distributive equality which is egalitarian in the sense that it relies on 
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relational considerations. The autonomy-based position defended here develops a very 
differentiated form of egalitarianism, an egalitarianism that finds expression in the notion that 
autonomy needs to be supported by a complex form of egalitarian distributions of goods. 
This differentiated form of egalitarianism, which to some might be too much of a 
move away from old egalitarian ambitions, faces the following objection by anti-egalitarians. 
They might argue that it remains unclear why reducing the principle of equality to the notion 
of universality as we defended it in the case of the overridng principle of equal respect should 
not also be adequate in the case of the principle of distributive equality. This move would 
make the concept of equality superfluous altogether.  
According to anti-egalitarians who relativize the normative meaning of the idea of 
equality, one can justify the claim that people have a moral right to access to certain goods by 
appealing to nonrelational evaluative standards. If the situation of individuals, considered in 
itself, does not fulfill the minimal conditions for a good life, then people simply deserve more 
goods. All this is justfied by nonrelational normative considerations: people should not be 
hungry and should not starve, people should not live marginalized, people should not live in 
poverty, sick people have a right to medical care, and people should have adequate living 
space.  
Anti-egalitarians hold that the claim of people to an adequate amount of basic goods 
can be justified independently of the situation of other people, without considering, for 
example, whether they have more goods and if so, how many more goods. The only relevant 
question for anti-egalitarians is whether each person has a sufficient amount. In Harry 
Frankfurt‘s words: “ The fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supposing that it is 
morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of 
them has.” 6 It is important to ensure that people have enough goods to survive or— on a 
higher level— that they live a good life. 
Frankfurt’ s principle of sufficiency states that it is irrelevant whether some people 
have more than others if all have enough to lead a decent life. Frankfurt sees the principle of 
sufficiency as an alternative to egalitarianism. But the problem remains that we have reason to 
ask whether inequalities in income and wealth beyond the level of sufficiency are justified 
and whether these inequalities violate basic notions of equality.     
The anti-egalitarian position seems wrong to me. The concept of distributive equality 
cannot be replaced altogether by nonrelational standards that grant people certain goods. The 
problem of distributive equality is a genuine problem, since we can decide the question 
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whether and to what extent people have a claim to certain goods only if we take relational 
considerations into account. The trivial example of dividing a cake shows us the connection 
between claims to goods and genuinely egalitarian, i.e., relational, arguments. The equal 
division of a cake among children seems prima facie morally justified and we need good 
reasons for an unequal distribution: the child has already had a piece of cake, it is the child’ s 
birthday, etc. 
The cake example is important in two respects: On the one hand it emphasizes that 
inequalities have to be justified; on the other hand— and this is more important— it 
demonstrates that the amount of cake given to a particular child depends on the well-grounded 
claims of the other children in relation to the size of the cake overall. Of course we can give 
the whole cake to one child, but the morally adequate justification for doing this cannot 
simply be found in the absolute standard of humanness of this child if there are other children 
present who seem equally human. Perhaps the others do not want any cake, perhaps they 
already had more of another cake than was good for them, but all this makes clear that 
nonrelational standards of value cannot answer the question to what extent we should grant 
people goods. A nonrelational justification for providing people with goods is an open and 
unspecific standard— we do not know the range from smallest amount to largest amount that 
the standard includes. Two criteria for a specification seem possible: first, the standard of 
fulfilling the basic needs of people, second, the idea that people should have the goods not 
only to survive, but to lead a good life. 
The first criterion seems too minimal. If societies can afford it, then they have to do 
more than just enable people to survive. The second criterion seems too vague. The idea that 
people should have a good life is problematic if it divorces individuals from the context in 
which they live. The difficulty is that the continual effort to improve the lives of some people 
can use up the resources needed to improve the situation of other people or other groups of 
people. Under conditions of scarce resources— ad these conditions hold for relatively wealthy 
countries— we cannot answer the question how much people deserve independently of the 
question how much others should get.  
 My position distinguishes two levels: an absolute standard (namely, universal respect) 
and a relational standard of distribution. This circumvents the equality problem, since I have 
made it clear that universal respect is not a principle of equality. The step from an absolute 
standard of recognition to a relational standard of distribution is legitimate, as the 
complexities of the social world make it morally necessary to allow differences in regard to 
distributions. Some goods we distribute strictly equally in democratic political systems, like 
the right to freedom of conscience, the political right to vote, and the opportunity to be a 
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candidate for political office. Other goods are not distributed equally, and often this is 
perfectly acceptable, as it does not diminish our status as human beings. It is of course not a 
violation of the condition of universal respect that Olympic gold medals are given to some but 
not to others.  
 I defend a rather modest version of egalitarianism that associates it with the thesis that 
relational considerations are indispensible. Someone might object that the way the argument 
proceeds, from a strong notion of real freedom to goods as the means to preserve that 
freedom, can also be made by nonegalitarian considerations. That is, the normative goal of 
granting persons freedom and autonomy tells us the particular goods and economic means to 
which persons are entitled. So the entitlement can be justified by reasons that do not appeal to 
a principle of equality. But this is not sufficient. In a world of scarce resources, it is necessary 
to weigh the claims of persons to goods in relation to the claims of others and in relation to 
the entire amount of goods available for distribution. Goods cannot be distributed by 
absolutist moral standards, as this might lead to unacceptable consequences. Perhaps your 
absolutist standard is to make a  certain person as happy and well off as possible, and so you 
tend to give this person all the things available. This might be fine in a world of endless 
resources, but it is not adequate in a world of limited resources. A political theory must fulfill 
minimal conditions of moral adequacy and in this case that means taking account of the fact 
that all questions of granting people goods invite relational considerations— namely, how 
many people have claims and how much we can give them in relation to the entire amount of 
goods and the equal claims of others. 
The autonomy-based conception offered here, though it is clearly not libertarian,  
seems at first sight very different from the egalitarian forms of political liberalism defended, 
for example, by Rawls and Dworkin. But I think a closer look at Rawls’ s theory reveals that 
there are strong tendencies to a freedom-based conception, though he defines his position as 
egalitarian liberalism. I note, for example, that Rawls’ s first principle of justice, the liberty 
principle, is given priority over both the principle of equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle. His distinction between freedom and the value of freedom seems quite close to the 
thesis that the function of the principle of equality of opportunity is to secure freedom. But 
Rawls does not speak that way and he cannot, as he considers equality to be an intrinsic value. 
However, we can read his theory differently.  
Rawls does not declare freedom to be an overriding political value. If he understood 
the principle of equal freedom as central, in the way Kant considered it as central, then the 
structure of his theory would change. The difference principle would then only refer to the 
conditions for realizing freedom and would be part of the first principle of justice— the idea of 
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an adequate system of equal freedoms for all. Similarly, the principle of equality of 
opportunity would also be part of the idea of equal freedom; it would spell out this idea in 
terms of positions in society.7 
 Dworkin seems the most eloquent defender of an egalitarian liberalism. He considers 
equality in the form of “ equal respect and equal consideration”  to be the basic ideal of his 
political philosophy. The goal of this liberalism is to achieve egalitarian structures and 
conditions for granting people equality of resources. Freedom is a necessary condition for 
formulating Dworkin’ s conception of equality of resources, as “ freedom”  means “ greatest 
possible autonomy in decisions about the allocation of resources.”  So equality, both on the 
abstract level of universal respect and on the level of distributive equality, seems the dominant 
value. 
  But a closer look reveals a different picture of this strong and dominant form of 
egalitarianism. Equality has such a central position in Dworkin’ s theory because he reads the 
principle of univeral respect as a principle of equality, which, as I have argued, is simply 
implausible. And the impression that freedom seems to have a functional role in the context of 
equality of resources is hardly tenable, since Dworkin of course also extends the idea of 
freedom to cover all those basic rights of freedom (political freedom, freedom of expression, 
freedom of religion) that cannot be regarded as instrumental in realizing equality of resources. 
So it seems more reasonable to give freedom a different status and interpret equality of 
resources as a necessary condition for helping people to real freedom. This shows that on one 
plausible reading, Dworkin’ s liberalism is not so far from an autonomy-based conception of 
political theory. 
If we look back on the development of political liberalism, beginning with Locke and 
Kant, we see that in their political philosophies freedom has a strong and central position.The 
function of the state is to protect the negative freedom of people— their freedom as a “ natural 
human right,”  as Kant says. The versions of egalitarian liberalism we meet in the second half 
of the twentieth century clearly undermine this dominant status of freedom and emphasize the 
notion of equality.8 
The principal reasons for this shift away from freedom to equality can be found in the 
rather problematic status of property rights in the liberalism of Locke and Kant. According to 
Locke, the state must protect the property rights that people already held in the state of nature. 
This provokes the obvious objection that such a political conception simply conserves those 
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dramatic and unjustified inequalities which are the result of contingent and arbitrary 
appropriation of uninhabited areas of land in the state of nature. 
 Kant’ s liberalism is not equally vulnerable to that criticism. Kant’ s principle of right, 
which demands that the freedom of one person is compatible with the equal freedom of all 
others, seems to block unacceptable consequences arising from the initial assumption of 
property. But Kant himself did not consider the dimension of distributive equality. Equality in 
his political philosophy remains nothing more than “ equality under the law,” *OHLFKKHLWYRU
GHP*HVHW] „ der Gleichheit der Menschen im gemeinen Wesen als Untertanen“ 9 But 
basically Kant’ s theory has the potential to be rewritten as a freedom-based political theory 
open to considerations of distributive equality, especially if one moves from Kant’ s clearly 
negative concept of freedom to a more substantial notion of real freedom. 
The autonomy-based conception I defend is individualistic. Central to it is the freedom 
of each person to be able to realize her conception of a good life, which entails the guarantee 
of political and social rights. This amounts to a difference from other freedom-based theories. 
In Habermas’ s theory of democracy, a general discourse principle, according to which the 
legitimacy of norms are dependent on the consent of those for whom the norms are relevant, 
is equally the source of private and public autonomy, i.e., autonomy in the public-political 
sphere. This means that for Habermas private and public autonomy are on the same level. 
 In my conception the private autonomy of individuals is paramount because we can 
only construct a decisive argument for public autonomy if we presuppose that private 
autonomy is a central value. An autonomy-centered political theory avoids the greatest danger 
of a crude and unreflective interpretation of egalitarianism, namely, violating the individual 
freedom of people in an overambitious impulse to make people equal. 
 
Feminist Perspectives on Freedom and Equality 
 
 I think that the autonomy-based conception outlined here can also receive endorsement 
from a feminist point of view. This might seem a strange thesis. An autonomy-based political 
theory is clearly in the tradition of political liberalism, and liberalism does not find much 
favor among feminist philosophers. And for the most part feminist political theory has 
focused on the concept of equality, not freedom. 
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 Sometimes liberalism is not strictly separated from a libertarian view, but it should be 
clear that the conception developed here is neither libertarian nor neo-liberal. Historically, 
freedom-based political philosophies, like all other political theories, have all had one 
shortcoming in common:  they simply ignore gender differences. But that alone does not 
disqualify theories that take up ideas like autonomy or freedom. And it is obvious that in 
feminist philosophy the concept of autonomy has recently garnered more attention, though the 
definitions of autonomy vary. 
Feminist philosophers have done substantial work on the analysis of the structures of 
power. They have revealed the forms of deep subjugation that are a result of the conventional 
constructions of sex and gender. They have made clear how gender constraints affect people 
and diminish their choice of an identity. I think this work shows that autonomy does have a 
central position in feminist theory. The autonomy to define one’ s own identity and give it 
expression in a certain form of life is crucial for women. Despite vast differences, all women 
have discovered that on the basis of a morally irrelevant attribute like sex one can be 
subjected to normative constructions that severely limit one’ s autonomy. And discourses 
about queer and drag are vivid expressions of the demand to define, decide, and determine for 
ourselves who we want to be and what picture of ourselves we want to present to others. 
Securing the real autonomy of women demands a special sensitivity to the informal ways in 
which repressive gender constructions work. 
 Nevertheless, the thesis that feminist political theory can build on the basic 
assumptions of an autonomy-based liberalism needs a careful justification, since many 
feminist philosophers are deeply skeptical toward liberalism. Their reservations are not 
merely directed at the inattention to gender displayed by many liberal philosophers, but focus 
as well on basic categories and postulates of liberalism. The values of freedom and equality 
are constitutive elements of liberalism, but feminist philosophers have criticized the principle 
of equality and the concept of freedom in liberalism. The project of making people equal, 
according to this criticism, would require women to adopt male standards. Male ways of 
living and male understandings of success would constitute the norm to which women would 
have to conform if they were to count as equal. Seen from this angle, equality seems to be a 
deeply ambivalent ideal, as its demand for abstraction requires women to strip away all those 
differences that are characteristic of their lives and their situation in society.  
 Feminist philosophers also criticize the individualistic concept of freedom we find in 
liberalism. They argue that the greatest possible freedom in pursuing a chosen conception of 
good life reflects a male ideal of autonomy that remains alien to women, who often live in a 
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close net of responsibilities for children and elderly family members.10 But this critique does 
not touch the ideas of equality and freedom as such; it just shows that these concepts have to 
be formulated in a way that frees them from all gender-specific biases. Equality in the sense 
of sameness and adaptiveness can be abandoned if equality is associated with the idea of 
universal respect and if, at the distributive level, equality is seen as a precondition of freedom. 
The ideal of autonomy in choosing one’ s form of life seems more convincing if we reflect 
clearly on those barriers that undermine the freedom of women.  
           Feminists also object that liberalism presupposes an atomistic conception of the 
subject. This criticism derives from the communitarian complaint that liberal theory 
conceptualizes individuals as unembodied and abstracted from the social contexts and 
communities in which they live. For women, as the criticism would have it, the view that 
individuals choose their goals freely is alien to the dense social relations in which they live. 
 But feminist philosophy should regard this criticism with skepticism. Feminist 
political theory is normatively inadequate if it adopts a conception of subjects so thoroughly 
embedded in their communities that the values of these communities become immutable 
constituents of their identities. Liberalism does not ignore the fact that individuals live in 
relations and communities. No political theory can ignore the fact that people live in social 
contexts that generate concrete responsibilities which must be taken into account in choosing 
different ways of life. But persons disposed to liberalism reflect their own social situations 
and sometimes they overtheorize their social responsibilities. From a feminist perspective, the 
idea that individuals permanently reflect their value commitments and the ways they should 
understand their social ties to others seems to be an acceptable one. The principle that 
individuals should freely commit themselves to the social relations that create special 
responsibilities can be of normative value for feminism. 
 In mainstream liberalism this ideal of autonomy focuses on male subjects. Men have 
enjoyed greater opportunities to move freely in the private as well as the public sphere; they 
could decide freely whether they wanted to make use of their opportunities for political 
participation. For women it has been much harder to live such a form of autonomy. But this 
asymmetry is a consequence of the classical division between private and public. It is not a 
consequence of  the conception of the subject in liberalism. The autonomy ideal takes on 
masculine attributes if it is associated with the classical division between private and public, 
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  This is relational autonomy, which merely expresses the demand to be aware of others in the way one makes 
decisions. However, relational autonomy also relies in the end on the idea that we have to make our decisions as 
reflectively and freely as possible. For an exposition of relational autonomy cf. the contributions in: Mackenzie, 
Catriona und Natalie Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the 
Social Self, New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000. 
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yet if this division and the gender system it supports is given up, then the principle of 
autonomy can be separated from a male-biased gender context. Once the meaning of  
“ private”  is uncoupled from its association with femininity, it becomes possible for women to 
define themselves independently of traditional gender norms. They can then choose their 
conception of a good life freely. 
 The autonomy of persons is an indispensable standard of feminist theory. Often 
feminist philosophers consider the dissolving of fixed gendered identities as a moment that 
helps to elucidate the aspects of domination and power embedded in our traditional gender 
constructions. The idea of freedom, the aim to make persons autonomous, demands that we 
abandon all diminishing gender stereotypes. Gender identities become more fluid if 
individuals can define freely who they want to be, if they can transcend barriers of sexual and 
social identities to which they do not or can no longer consent. 
 Freedom includes more than a guarantee of negative rights. Negative freedom is not 
enough, as the mechanisms of power, normative symbolizations, and prejudices might make it 
impossible for certain social groups to make use of their rights. Securing autonomy requires 
an awareness of those informal and hidden uses of power that attach to traditional normative 
constructions of “ female”  and “ male.”  An autonomy-based liberalism that leaves these 
traditional gender concepts behind opens new perspectives for feminist political theory.  
  An autonomy-based political theory allows us to see well-known debates in a new 
light. I think, for example, that the whole problem of “ equality versus difference”  vanishes if 
one sees the individual freedom of women as central and considers distributional equality as a 
means to reach that freedom. The starting point of the dilemma “ equality versus difference”  
resides in two claims that cannot be easily reconciled and are in tension: first, that women 
should be equal to men, where “ equal”  amounts to “ being the same” ; and second, that women 
should be different from men. In the history of philosophy, the demand for women’ s equality 
to men has often been justified by reference to the fact that women have the same abilities as 
men and that they can do professionally what men can do. To be equal in the sense of  being 
like men is taken to rest on the fact that women and men share a morally relevant attribute, 
such as being human. But this idea of shared attributes does not support the general idea that 
equality might imply a sameness that neglects the important differences between women and 
men. 
 To be the same with regard to morally important attributes such as being human leaves 
enough space for differences. Yet often the analysis of questions of equality does not specify 
the morally relevant attributes. So the idea of sameness connected with equality develops 
beyond that shared possession of a relevant attribute into a diffuse idea of general sameness. 
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Feminist discussions also have a tendency to extend the idea of equality as sameness to 
morally irrelevant similarities.  
The conflation of equality with generalized sameness is one reason why many feminist 
philosophers are ambivalent toward the idea of equality. In several respects women are 
different from men, and the claim to be treated equally should not be trivialized by these 
differences. One difference between men and women is that only women get pregnant. The 
question is what this fact entails. In most welfare states it is recognized that in regard to 
pregnancy women should be treated differently, that they have a claim to medical care and 
leave for child rearing. It is meanwhile well known what absurd consequences can follow if 
equality between genders is identified with the sameness of men and women.11   
 Feminist political theory has so far tried to overcome the dilemma “ equality versus 
difference”  by a reformulation of the concept of equality. I will outline three versions of such 
an attempt. The first one is the devolepment of an androgynous conception of equality.12 This 
conception states that there are no relevant differences between men and women. On this 
view, pregnancy is a disability that should be compensated only if comparable disabilities in 
men are compensated, and women should serve in the military to the same extent as men. 
Making exceptions for women in these respects, it is argued, would support classical gender 
stereotypes— men are aggressive, women are caring— which again would undermine the 
equality between men and women. If equality demands androgyny of us, then presumably 
many feminist philosophers would prefer to be wholeheartedly anti-egalitarian.  
 A radical conception of androgyny forces women to adapt to a system of rules for 
social behavior that undermines their autonomy. Why should women accept male standards 
via a general norm of androgyny? Why should equality for women demand that they do all 
the things that men do and why should there be no differences in the social settings of women 
and men? Androgyny is not a convincing normative ideal. As Catharine MacKinnon critically 
remarks, “ Sexism is a problem not of gender differentiation, but of gender hierarchy, in which 
gender differentiation is only one strategy.” 13  
 Another way to escape the “ equality versus difference”  problem is to define equality 
as acceptance of differences.14 Biological and cultural differences are assumed to be in 
harmony with the concept of equality. Differences are unproblematic as long as they are not 
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 See the justifications of certain insurance companies that pregnancy should not be compensated since 
pregancy is not a disability. This argument implicitly takes male illnesses as the standard for insurance benefits.  
12
 Williams, Wendy, The Equality Crisis. Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, in: Diana Tietjens 
Meyers (ed.), Feminist Social Thought. A Reader, New York/London: Routledge 1997, pp. 696 – 713. 
13
 MacKinnon, Catharine A., Feminism Unmodified , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 118.  
14
  Littleton, Christine A.: Reconstructing Sexual Equality, in: Diana Tietjens Meyers (ed.), Feminist Social 
Thought, pp. 715-734. 
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used to justify inequalities between women and men. Difficulties arise only if gender-specific 
differences are used to justify inequalities. On the difference view, whether the differences are 
biologically or culturally induced is not relevant. What is decisive is whether they entail 
inequalities that amount to a form of discrimination. As Christine Littleton writes, “ [T]he 
function of equality is to make gender differences, perceived or actual, costless relative to 
each other, so that anyone may follow a male, female, or androgynous life style according to 
their natural inclination or choice.” 15 This passage implicitly makes the shift from equality to 
autonomy by emphasizing women’ s right to define their form of life. Littleton’ s position 
obviously comes close to the autonomy-based conception outlined earlier, in that she believes 
the claims resulting from women’ s specific situations must be considered if women on all 
levels of social life are to be treated as equal.  
 The next approach, which we find in Catharine MacKinnon’ s work, defines equality as 
freedom from dominance. MacKinnon is skeptical of the notion of difference, as she sees 
difference as a disguised form of dominance.16 The appeal to difference permits the unequal 
treatment of women in many problematic cases. MacKinnon argues that it is important for 
women to reach equality in such a way that being equal is not measured with reference to a 
male norm. Neither androgyny nor the emphasis on difference can fulfill this criterion, since, 
she contends, they both rely on a male standard. The androgyny view of equality directs us to 
assess women’ s conceptions of a life worth living according to whether they conform to male 
norms of a successful career. The difference view of equality amounts to judging the degree 
to which women deviate from men.  
Littleton’ s approach and MacKinnon’ s both aim at a differentiated conception of 
equality. But neither define this conception exactly. Nor do they differentiate between 
equality in the sense of a general standard of equal or universal recognition and respect and 
the notion of distributive equality. Their appeals to equality seem to cover both levels without 
distinguishing between them. 
 The dilemma of “ equality versus difference”  cannot be resolved if “ equality”  implies 
sameness in every respect. But “ equality”  does not mean sameness in every respect. It means 
sameness with regard to a certain parameter, whether this be capabilities, interests, chances, or 
rights. We can integrate difference into this concept of equality. And a complex notion of 
distributional equality reconciles sameness and difference. A complex notion of equality is of 
course open to such differences as amount of time worked, qualifications, and needs. When 
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 MacKinnon, Catharine A., Sex Equality. On Difference and Dominance, in: Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State, Cambridge MA und London: Harvard University Press 1989. 
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one considers the structure of an autonomy-based conception of equality and the relations 
between freedom and equality within that conception, it becomes quite obvious that equality 
is open to all sorts of differences. 
 Because a principle of universal respect and recognition implies that women should 
have the autonomy to choose their form of life, women can be as different from men— and as 
similar— as they want to be. If we accord primary importance to the idea that all people 
should have the autonomy to live their form of life, and if distributive equality is a necessary 
means of reaching that autonomy, then we have a great range of differences. But in a world of 
differences it also becomes crucial to judge which ones are an expression of freedom and 
which are opposed to the realization of autonomy.  
 Regarding freedom as a central value of political theory permits us to generate a 
conception of equality that is sensitive to differences. The idea of freedom, especially the idea 
of equal freedom, allows us to reconcile difference and equality. If freedom is the paramount 
value, then the central normative question is not whether women are equal to men or different 
from men, but whether they have as much freedom as men to choose their way of  life. The 
demand that we choose either equality or difference (but not both) is a hindrance to real 
freedom. Equality in the sense of sameness forces women to adapt to norms that undermine 
the principle of freedom as the autonomous decision to pursue a plan of life. Freedom for 
women means that women can with impunity choose forms of life that are similar in some 
contexts to the career structures of male life plans, or, if they wish, they can choose lives that 
are radically different from male career biographies. 
    The principle of equal freedom has the potential to erode traditional gender 
stereotypes. The opposition “ equality versus freedom”  perpetuates traditional gender 
stereotypes: women are either like men or different. But in a society in which gender has 
begun to lose its discriminatory effects, these categorizations become increasingly 
problematic. Where women’ s freedom to choose a conception of life is the relevant normative 
parameter, discriminations due to gendered identities become more readily apparent.    
 Egalitarian political conceptions tend to see both freedom and equality as values in 
themselves. This has made them rather helpless in regard to the often discussed conflict 
between freedom and equality, in that the effort to make some people more equal reduces the 
freedom of others. An autonomy-based political theory as outlined here cannot solve all 
problems of freedom and equality, but it can show at least that freedom and equality in the 
sense elucidated here are compatible. If we ask ourselves how the basic institutions of society 
should be structured so that people have real freedom, then equality enters the politcal sphere 
in a moderate but convincing form. The burden of proof seems to be on the side of those 
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libertarians for whom the idea of distributive equality is a myth altogether. They have to show 
us why real freedom should be the privilege of some, but not of others.   
